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Abstract. This paper introduces an oﬀ-tag RFID access control mech-
anism called “Selective RFID Jamming”. Selective RFID Jamming pro-
tects low-cost RFID tags by enforcing access control on their behalf, in
a similar manner to the RFID Blocker Tag. However, Selective RFID
Jamming is novel because it uses an active mobile device to enforce cen-
tralized ACL-based access control policies. Selective RFID Jamming also
solves a Diﬀerential Signal Analysis attack to which the RFID Blocker
Tag is susceptible.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) is coming, and it’s bringing a streamlined
revolution. Passive RFID tags are batteryless computer chips that are powered
externally by their RFID readers. These “radio barcodes” can transmit infor-
mation using radio waves, eliminating the need for a line of sight. RFID tags
pose unique security and privacy challenges. Because of their severe process-
ing, storage, and cost constraints, even standard security properties like access
control are diﬃcult to implement. Several access control solutions exist for high-
end RFID tags, but these mechanisms increase the price of RFID tags beyond
what some application scenarios (e.g. supply chain management) will allow. This
leaves low-cost (<$0.10) Electronic Product Code (EPC)-style tags without the
ability to protect the privacy of their users.
In this paper, we suggest an access control mechanism for low-cost RFID tags
called Selective RFID Jamming. Selective RFID Jamming extends protection to
low-cost tags by enforcing access control on their behalf. Selective RFID Jam-
ming achieves this by performing RF signal “jamming” (similar to the RFID
Blocker Tag). However, Selective RFID Jamming has three unique character-
istics: 1) It is implemented on active mobile device, 2) It utilizes ACL-based
security policies, 3) It uses a Digital Signal Analysis (DSA) resistant jamming
signal.
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2 Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) is the latest phase in the decades-old
trend of the miniaturization of computers. RFID transponders are tiny resource-
limited computers that do not have a battery that needs periodic replacement.
RFID tags are inductively powered by their external reading devices, called
RFID readers. Once the RFID tag is activated, the tag then decodes the incoming
query and produces an appropriate response by modulating the request signal,
using one or more subcarrier frequencies. RFID Tags can do a limited amount
of processing, and have a small amount (<1024 bits) of storage.
RFID tags are useful for a huge variety of applications. Some of these appli-
cations include: supply chain management, automated payment, physical access
control, counterfeit prevention, and smart homes and oﬃces. RFID tags are also
implanted in all kinds of personal and consumer goods. For example, RFID tags
are used in passports, partially assembled cars, frozen dinners, ski-lift passes,
clothing, and public transportation tickets. Implantable RFID tags for animals
allow concerned owners to label their pets and livestock. Verichip Corp. has also
created a slightly-adapted implantable RFID chip, the size of a grain of rice, for
use in humans. Since its introduction, the Verichip was approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, and this tiny chip is currently deployed in both
commercial and medical systems.
2.1 RFID Threat Model
Like many other pervasive technologies, the success of RFID threatens to bring
unwanted social consequences. RFID tags face unique security and privacy risks,
not just because the transponders will be located everywhere, but because they
are too computationally limited to support traditional security and privacy en-
hancing technologies. This lack of protection leads to some undesirable scenarios,
like the unauthorized access of tag data, interception of tag-reader communica-
tions, and location tracking of people and objects.
A growing number of RFID security and privacy solutions have been proposed,
but none have yet succeeded to ensure security and privacy in a wide range of
RFID application scenarios. The least amount of progress has been made in pro-
tecting the application scenario that is the most common - supply chain manage-
ment, using low-cost Electronic Product Code (EPC) tags. Low-cost RFID tags
require new RFID security and privacy techniques. For the sake of clarity, we will
now make a distinction between low-cost and high-cost RFID tags:
Low-cost RFID tags. Low-cost RFID Tags should cost between ﬁve and ten
cents. They are usually used in supply-chain management, and they usually
conform to the EPC standard. These RFID tags usually have a kill mechanism,
but they are not powerful enough to support cryptography.
High-cost RFID tags. High-cost RFID Tags will cost more than ten cents.
They are used in the numerous applications outside of supply-chain management,
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Table 1. On-tag vs. Oﬀ-tag Security Mechanisms
On-Tag Oﬀ-Tag
Kill commands Faraday cages
Sleep/wake modes Blocker tags
Pseudonyms External re-encryption
Hash locks
Cryptography/authentication
and they can support many diﬀerent standards. These RFID tags usually have
one or more security mechanisms (kill/sleep/wake modes, cryptography).
3 Selective RFID Jamming
Selective RFID Jamming is a form of “oﬀ-tag” access control that produces a
jamming signal when an access control check fails.
To understand how Selective RFID Jamming works, it is useful to understand
the diﬀerence between on-tag and oﬀ-tag access control. Table 1 lists some on-tag
and oﬀ-tag versions of access control mechanisms. As the name implies, on-tag
access control mechanisms are located on the RFID tags themselves. On-tag ac-
cess control is the most common type of RFID access control, with mechanisms
including: tag deactivation, cryptography, and tag-reader authentication. In con-
trast, oﬀ-tag access control mechanisms put the access control mechanism on a
device external to the RFID tag. Examples of this include the RSA Blocker tag
and external re-encryption. Oﬀ-tag access control has the advantage that it can
protect low-cost RFID tags (like EPC tags), because the access control doesn’t
require any extra complexity (hence, extra cost) on the RFID tag itself.
Here is how Selective RFID Jamming works:
1. An RFID reader sends a query to an RFID tag
2. The mobile device captures and decodes the query (in real-time), and deter-
mines whether the query is permitted
3. If the query is not allowed, the mobile device brieﬂy sends a jamming signal
that is just long enough to block the RFID tag response
The top-level concept is similar to the idea behind the RSA Blocker Tag[8].
However, Selective RFID Jamming has three unique characteristics: 1) It is im-
plemented on active mobile device, 2) It utilizes ACL-based security policies,
and 3) It uses a DSA-resistant jamming signal.
3.1 Active Mobile Devices
Selective RFID Jamming is always implemented in a battery-powered mobile
device (e.g. PDA or mobile phone). This is important because Selective RFID
Jamming needs to perform resource-intensive security protocols, such as signal
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Table 2. Example Access Control List
Action Source Target Command Comment
block * MYTAGS * Suppress all queries targeting user’s tags
allow Home MYTAGS * Home system can query user’s tags
allow Wal-Mart MYTAGS Read data block Wal-Mart can read (not write) data from user’s tags
allow * * * All queries to other RFID tags are OK
jamming and authentication. To implement such functionality on an RFID tag
would cause severe restrictions in terms of power and storage. Using a device
with an ‘active’ power-source avoids problems that ‘passive’ solutions like RFID
tags face, such as the unreliable production of jamming signals based upon phys-
ical orientation. Adequate storage space is also important, because it limits the
complexity of the access control policies that can be used. On-tag RFID access
control mechanisms only have access to 1024 bits of storage at most. However,
battery-powered mobile devices are full-blown computers, that have no compa-
rable storage restrictions. This allows access control policies to contain enough
entries that they can provide very granular access control.
3.2 Access Control Lists
Selective RFID Jamming uses Access Control Lists (ACLs) to represent security
policies. It ‘selectively ﬁlters’ RFID tag responses, much in the same way that a
ﬁrewall ﬁlters packets from a network. ACLs specify which RFID query responses
are blocked or allowed, based upon the source (the reader issuing the query),
the target (the RFID tags aﬀected by the query), and the command (ex. read
data/write data/inventory). Table 2 shows a sample ACL.
Selective RFID Jamming enforces access control for the localized RFID tags of
a single user. This contrasts with themajority of RFID access controlmechanisms,
which protect individual RFID tags, wherever they may be. Since Selective RFID
Jamming provides localized RFID access control, it could also be used protect
ﬁxed locations. (e.g. protecting a store from RFID-enabled corporate espionage).
RFID queries do not contain information about the issuing RFID readers, so
the source of RFID requests are ascertained by means of an authentication pro-
tocol (using in- or out-of-band communications). “Friendly” RFID Readers may
explicitly perform authentication ahead of time, swapping some information that
can be used to create authenticated ‘sessions’. These authenticated RFID Readers
may have their own entries in the ACL, giving them special permissions to perform
certain kinds of queries. “Unfriendly”RFIDReaders (orRFIDReaders that simply
are not familiar with Selective RFID Jamming) will not perform any authentica-
tion protocol at all, andwill simply issue their queries. TheACL should also specify
a set of ‘default’ access control rules, that govern access for these unknown read-
ers. Table 2 shows how authenticated RFID Readers from the user’s home and the
Wal-Mart, are given special dispensation to query the user’s RFID tags. 1
1 Authentication requires shared keys, which require key setup between RFID Readers
and the jamming device.
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The jamming device extracts the targeted tags and the command type from
the query signal, and match these values to the information stored in the access
control lists. The jamming device may store lists of RFID tags, including ‘tag
ownership’ lists, that specify tags owned or otherwise associated with the user.
(Another one might list the former owners of RFID tags). Ranges of RFID
identiﬁers might be represented similarly to ranges of IP addresses. For example,
the mask “01.0000A89.00016F.0/60” speciﬁes an 8-bit EPC Header, 28-bit EPC
Manager, and 24-bit EPC Object Class, but not the 36-bit EPC Serial Number.
Access is then restricted based upon the stored RFID tag information. Table 2
illustrates how access control is restricted for certain commands, for tags in a
speciﬁc ownership list called MYTAGS.
Note that these access control checks must be performed in real-time. These
real-time checks are possible because RFID Readers make a small pause be-
tween issuing queries and listening for RFID tag responses. (In the case of ISO
15693/18000, the pause is 300 microseconds long). In this time, a high-end mi-
crocontroller has enough available clock cycles to perform the required access
control checks. Here is an example: the StrongARM SA-1100, running at 206
MHz has a performance of 235 MIPS. This means that it can perform over
70,000 operations in 300 microseconds. While this budget is not suﬃcient for
performing public key cryptography, it does oﬀers enough cycles for simple ACL
checks, calculating checksums, or possibly even symmetric key decryption.
3.3 DSA-Resistant Jamming Signal
The Problem. RFID Blocker Tags[8], introduced by Juels, Rivest, and Szydlo,
interfere with RFID Readers’ tree-walk tag singulation algorithm by always re-
plying with a ‘0|1’ signal. This response causes a collision, which forces the RFID
reader to traverse the entire ID space to discover the IDs of nearby RFID tags.
RFID Tags will usually not meet the singulation criteria, during the Blocker
Tag induced full binary tree ID traversal. This means that the majority of the
time during tag singulation, the Blocker Tag(s) are the only entities that are
responding. Additionally, because the responses from RFID Blocker Tags are
always the same, the analog signals received from the RFID Blocker will also be
identical.
The Attack. In order to perform diﬀerential signal analysis, we need to mod-
ify an RFID Tag Reader to measure and record the additive waveform that
results from the interference of all incoming RFID signals. If an RFID Reader
records the analog signal received during tag singulation, the mode (or most
commonly appearing) ‘tag response’ signal will be the combined waveform of
the ‘0|1’ responses, sent from the one or more Blocker Tags that are present.
Because this signal never changes, it can be mathematically averaged out from
the total recorded waveforms. The left-over signal will be the genuine RFID tag
responses.
Illustrating the Attack. We will illustrate our attack through use of an example,
shown in Figure 1 .
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Fig. 1. Scenario: RFID Tags and Blockers
Let’s hypothetically say that we use RFID tags with 3-bit ids (8 possible tags).
We also assume that RFID tag IDs are unique – no two authentic RFID tags
will use the same ID. We have an RFID reader in the center of a circular range,
and four RFID tags (T1-T4), and two RFID blocker tags (B1-B2) are present.
It’s easy to detect the presence of RFID blocker tags. If no (or few) tags seem
to be missing during singulation, then it’s likely that one or more RFID blocker
tags are present. Additionally, if we attempt to perform singulation on each of
the ‘leaf nodes’ (3-bit complete ID’s), we will constantly get collisions, that will
be composed of the combined signals shown in Table 3.
In each of these cases, we received collisions, so the reader will not be able to
read the individual tag ID’s. However the reader is able to detect total additive
signal, produced by the multiple RFID tags.
Half of the measured analog waveforms received are equal to B1+B2. If we
take the mode (most frequently occurring value) of all of the measured 3-bit ID
signal strengths, we will get B1+B2. If we use 8-bit tag IDs instead of 3-bit tag
ID’s, the predominance of the mode throughout a range sweep will be even more
obvious. Now all we have to do is subtract the signal (B1+B2) from each total
signal received during the actual tree-walk singulation process, and we’ll get the
Table 3. Analog waveforms received during an RFID tag sweep
Queried Tags Combined Signal
Sub-tree starting with ‘000’ T4+B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘001’ B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘010’ T2+B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘011’ B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘100’ T1+B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘101’ B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘110’ T3+B1+B2
Sub-tree starting with ‘111’ B1+B2
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Table 4. Subtracting blocker signals during RFID tag singulation
Singulated Node Combined Signal Subtracted Signal
Sub-tree starting with ‘0’ T2+T4+B1+B2 T2+T4
Sub-tree starting with ‘00’ T4+B1+B2 T4
Sub-tree starting with ‘000’ T4+B1+B2 T4
Sub-tree starting with ‘001’ B1+B2 No signal
Sub-tree starting with ‘01’ T2+B1+B2 T2
Sub-tree starting with ‘010’ T2+B1+B2 T2
Sub-tree starting with ‘011’ B1+B2 No signal
Sub-tree starting with ‘1’ T1+T3+B1+B2 T1+T3
Sub-tree starting with ‘10’ T1+B1+B2 T1
Sub-tree starting with ‘100’ T1+B1+B2 T1
Sub-tree starting with ‘101’ B1+B2 No signal
Sub-tree starting with ‘11’ T3+B1+B2 T3
Sub-tree starting with ‘110’ T3+B1+B2 T3
Sub-tree starting with ‘111’ B1+B2 No signal
following results, shown in Table 4. The RFID Reader can now easily determine
which RFID tags are present.
Preventing Signal Analysis. Selective RFID Jamming produces a randomly mod-
ulated jamming signal, at a single frequency (ex. 13.56 MHz). The idea is that
because the signal is randomly modulated, it cannot be easily averaged out. We
use a single antenna to produce this jamming signal2. The only caveat to keep
in mind is the following: if you collect enough samples of the same signal added
with the random signal, you can often still average out the random signal. So
careful attention must be paid to the design of the randomization function.
4 Discussion
Selective RFID Jamming provides centralized (multi-tag) access control, while
most on-tag mechanisms provide decentralized (per tag) access control. This
centralization has its advantages. Access control lists are easier to update, plus
centralizing RFID access control has a cost advantage. A per-tag access control
mechanism, like the RFID Blocker Tag, is used 1:1 in proportion with the RFID
tags that are protected. Reproducing so many copies of the access control mech-
anism may be cost prohibitive in some applications. However, only one mobile
device is necessary to protect hundreds of a user’s low-cost tags using Selective
RFID Jamming.
Selective RFID Jamming has an unresolved problem: Denial of Service at-
tacks. If an attacker deliberately performs lots of unauthorized RFID queries,
the jamming signal production will jam up the airwaves, causing interference
with other nearby RFID systems. A secondary problem is that this repeated
production of jamming signals will also drain the battery of the mobile device.
Unfortunately, this is not an easy problem to solve.
2 The Blocker Tag uses two antennas – one to produce the ‘0’ response and one to
produce the ‘1’ response. However, this is not necessary to produce a ‘1|0’ collision
signal.
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Selective RFID Jamming has a few other problems including: 1) The active
mobile device is a single point of failure, 2) There might be legal problems,
and 3) Selective RFID Jamming won’t stop RFID readers using very directional
antennas. We would like to further address these issues in future work.
5 Related Work
Oﬀ-tag RFID access control was pioneered by Juels, Rivest, and Szydlo with
their RFID Blocker Tag. As described in Section 3.3, the RFID Blocker Tag
interferes with RFID Reader singulation by “spooﬁng” the RFID Reader’s tree-
walk singulation protocol [8]. The Blocker Tag is diﬀerent from Selective RFID
Jamming because it is implemented on an RFID tag, it uses a static ‘0|1’ jamming
signal produced by two antennas, and it uses privacy-zones instead of access con-
trol lists. Several kinds of on-tag access control mechanisms also exist for RFID
technology. Tag deactivation, otherwise known as “tag killing” was standardized
by the EPCglobal consortium [1]. Juels also suggests the use of dynamic tag
identiﬁers, called pseudonyms, that use a mechanism called “pseudonym throt-
tling” to allow authenticated RFID readers to refresh the pseudonym list [7].
On-tag access control schemes work well for certain applications, but fail to pro-
tect low-cost EPC-style tags, which are too cheap to support these mechanisms.
High-cost RFID tags may also support RFID tag-reader authentication schemes.
Vajda and Buttyan oﬀer lightweight authentication protocols [9], and Weis, et.
al, proposed a randomized hash lock protocol for authentication [10]. Feldhofer,
et. al, proposes an extension to the ISO 18000 protocol, that would enable the
in-band transmission of authentication data [2]. Cryptographic primitives also
exist that may work with high-cost RFID tags. Finkenzeller describes the use
of stream ciphers [4], and Feldhofer, et. al, describes a low-cost AES implemen-
tation [3]. Gaubatz, et. al, describe a low cost NTRU implementation, designed
for sensor networks, that brings public key cryptography closer to ﬁtting the
constraints of RFID [6]. Low-cost RFID tags can also be protected by social
and legal factors. Simson Garﬁnkel proposes a legislative RFID “Bill of Rights”,
where he explicitly extends some ideas from the European Privacy Directive for
use with RFID [5].
6 Conclusion
Selective RFID Jamming is an access control scheme that uses battery-powered
devices to enforce ACL-based access control policies, with the aid of randomly
modulated jamming signals. Selective RFID Jamming enforces access control
on the behalf of low-cost RFID tags, which is useful for protecting cost-critical
applications (e.g. supply chain management) that currently lack access control.
It will combat RFID security and privacy threats, and can help ﬁght the battle
against the negative consequences that RFID technology will bring.
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Future work will provide more detail about the earlier mentioned access con-
trol and authentication schemes. Additionally, we plan to implement this func-
tionlity, to test the feasability of real-time RFID ﬁltering.
– Introduce the RFID Guardian
• (Battery-powered, mobile, 2-way RFID communications, personal RFID
privacy management)
• Implementable on already available devices (ex.RFID-enabled cellphones)
– Advantages
• Active devices have fewer storage constraints
∗ Enables very granular access control policies
• Active devices have fewer power constraints
∗ Reliable jamming signal production
• Low-cost
∗ Most RFID access control mechanisms are reproduced 1:1 with tags
∗ Able to protect many tags with one device
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